On the optimality of interest-bearing reserves in economies of overlapping generations by Scott Freeman & Joseph H. Haslag










Joseph H. Haslag, ResearchDepartment
FederalReserve Bankof Dallas
July 1993
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org)On the Optimality  of Interest-Bearing Reserves
in Economies  of Overlapping Generations
Scott Freeman, Research  Department




Joseph H. Haslag, Research  Department
Federal Reserve  Bank of Dallas
The views expressed  in this article are solely those of the authors and should not be attributed
to the Federal Reserve  Bank of Dallas or to the Federal Reserve  Svstem.On the Optimality of
-Interest-Bearin  g Reserves
in Economies  of Overlapping  Generations
Scott  Freeman
University  of Texas-Austin
and
Research  Associate
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Dallas
Joseph  H. Haslag
Federal Reserve  Bank of Dallas
and
Southern  Methodist  University
ABSTRACT: Paying  interest  on required  reserves  is considered  in an  overlapping  generations
model  in which the  return  to capital  dominates  the  retum  to fiat money. Smith (1991)  showed  that
financing  interest  on reserves  from lump-sum  taxes  benefits  the  initial old at the  expense  of future
generations.  Here,  such  a transfer  of wealth  is offset  with an  accommodating  open  market
purchase  so  that  interest  on reserves  is a Pareto  imprcvemenL  With an  accomnrodating  open
market  sale,  we show  that  abandoning  reserve  requirements  results  in identical  utility for initial and
futue generations  as  paying  interest  on reserves.  We also  show  that  paying  interest  on reserves
improves  welfare  even  when  linanced  by distorting  taxes.
The  authors  thank  Mike Cox,  Greg  Huffman,  Evan  Koenig,  and  Bruce  Smith  for helpful
discussions.The  payment  of interest  on reserves  held  at  the  central  bank  has  long been  advocated  [see,
for example,  Friedman's  A Programfor Monetary  Startlrfy (1960)1.  Advocates  note  that  the
payment  of a  market  rate  of interest  on required  reserves  eliminates  the  oppornrnity  cost  of holding
those  deposits  that  are-  subject  ,to  reserve+equirements.In  economies  of infinitely lived
representative  agents,  the  distortion  of reserve  requirements  is cosdessly  removed  if these  interest
payments  are  funded  through  lump-sum  taxes.
Smith  (1991)  demonstrates,  however,  that  the  payment  of interest  on  reserves,  even  if
financed  through  lump-sum  taxation,  actually  reduces  steady-state  utility in economies  of
overlapping  generations  of finitely lived agents.  The  increased  rate  of retum  on deposits  increases
the  demand  for deposits  and  thus  for reserves,  lowering  the price  level and  thus  increasing  the
wealth  of the  initial owners  of reserves.  The  taxes  on futwe generations  to finance  interest  on
reserves  thus  effect  a transfer  of wealth  from future  generations  to the  initial generation.  This loss
of wealth  makes  future generations  worse  off despite  the  increased  rate  of retum on deposits,
Smith  establishes  the  Pareto  optimality  of interest  on reserves  but wams  that  only the  initial
generation  gains  from fuancing interest  through  taxation,  even  if lump-sum.
In this paper,  we establish  that  not paying  interest  on reserves  is Pareto  inferioc there  is a
way to recapture  for the  future  generations  benefits  that  accrue  incidentally  to the  initial generation
as  a result  of the  payment  of interest  on required  reserves,  allowing  a Pareto  improvement.
Following  Auernheimer's  (1974)  prescription  for "honest"  seigniorage,  we  propose  an  openmarket  purchase  by the  cenral bank  that  offsets  the  cahnge  in money  demand  through  an
expansion  of the  monetary  base,  so  as  to leave  unchanged  the  price  level and  the  wealth  of the
initial generation.l  The  interest  from the  assets  thus  purchased  by the  central  bank  are  used  to help
finance  the  payment  of interest  on reserrr'es;  reducing  the taxation  of future generations.  We show
that  when  financed  in this way,  the  payment  of interest  on reserves  results  in a Pareto
improvement,  incrcasing  the  welfare  of the  future  genentions  without  hurting  or helping  the  initial
generation.
We go on to show  that  the  elimination  of reserve  requirements  accompanied  by a similarly
motivated  open  market  sale  of government  debt  can  also  rcsult  in a  Pareto  improvement.  Steady-
state  utility is incrcased  even  after  future  generations  are  taxed  to finance  the  intercst  on the
government  debt.
Finally, we demonstrate  that  financing  interest  through  distorting  taxes  is still a Pareto
improvement.  We introduce  a second  type  of capital,  which is not subject  to reserve  requirements
but which  may be  taxed.  We then  show  that  an  equal  tax on both  forms  of capital  is Pareo
improving  when  used  to pay  interest  on reserves.  This result  demonstrates  how rcserve
requirements  distorts  individual  choices  between  intermediated  and  uninterrnediated  capial.
Spreading  the  tax across  these  two types  of capital  is in the spirit of tlre  Ramsey  Rule  of efFrcient
I This open  market  purchase  has  the same  motivation  as  the  open  market  sale  proposed  by
Bacchetta  and  Caminal  (1990)  to offset  intergenerational  wealth  transfers  when  a govemnrent
financing  expenditures  from seigniorage  reduces  reserve  requirements  and  increases  the  rate  of
money  expansion,
2taxation, so that even a distoning tax on two t)?es of capital  raises  welfare compared to the case  in
which one is subject to a reserve  requirement without interest.
l.  Interest on R€serves
l.l  The Model
The  model  economy  is Smith's  (1991)  version  of the  overlapping  model  with reserve
requirements.2  There  is an  infinite  sequence  of periods  indexed  by t=L,2,3,....  Agents  live
two periods.  Within each  period  t, two generations  coexist  -- those  in the first period  of their life
(the  "young") and  those  in the  last  period  of their  life (the  "old").  There  are  N agents  bom in each
period  t > 1. In the  initial period,  t=1, there  are  also  N 1-period  lived agents  called  the  initial old.
There  exists  two assets  - fiat money  and  storage.  Each  of the  initial old agents  is endowed  with a
per capita  stock  of the storage  good  and  fiat money  balances,  denoted  k6  and  ms,  respectively.
The  initial old want  as  much  of the  consumption  good  in period 1 as  possible,
Young agents  have  the  twice  continuously  differentiable  utility function:  U(cr) + V(cd,
where  c; stands  for consumption  in the  ith  period  of an agent's  life.  It is further assumed  that
U'> 0, V'>  0, and  U"<0, and  V" < 0.3To  ensure  an  interior  solution,  U'(0) and  V'(0) are
assumed  infinite. Each  young  agent  receives  an  endowment  of y units  of the consumption  good,
2 See  also  Romer  (1985),  Sargent  and  Wallace  (1985),  and  Freeman  (1987).
3 The separability  ofthe utility function  is not essential  to rhe  arguments  but we wish to
follow Smith's  assumptions  and  notation  closely  to facilitate  comparison.
3but nothing  when  old. The  problem  facing  agents  is how to finance  consumption  when  old.
The  two assets--fiat  money  and  storage-offer  different  rates  of return.  When stored,  the
consumption  good  rcturns  x > 1 units  of the  consumption  good  in period  t+1 for each  unit sored
in period  t. Because-x  >'1r we r+ill-interpr€t  ftis storage  option  as equivalent  to capital. The  initial
old own I\4o  (= Nnd  units  of fiat money.  Fiat money  is intrinsically useless  and
noncounterfeitable.  The  young  can  trade  a unit of the  consumption  good  for p1  units  of fiat money.
In period  t+1, the  old (the  young  of period  t) trade  each  unit of fiat nnney for l/pa1 units  of the
consumption  good. Thus,  the  rate  of return  to fiat money  balances  held  by the  initial old is p,/p,*1.
Each  young  agent  is required  to hold a fraction lofhis  total real savings  Q5  in reserves  of
fiat money:
(1)  z1  >  TQr.
In every  period  after  the  initial period,  required  reserves  pay  p units  of fiat money  in net
interest  for each  unit held  in required  reserves.  Thus  for t > l, the  real  renrm  to a  required  unit of
fiat money  is p(1+ p)/pr*1  @ut  only p,/p,*1  if held  beyond  the level required).  A lump-sum  tax of
t units  of the  consumption  good  is collected  from each  old agent.  Except  for the  initial old, the
lump-sum  tax revenues  are  then  used  to pay  interest  on required  reserves.4
In addition  to collecting  taxes  and  paying  interest  on reserves,  we will allow the
4 We could  also  tax the  old in the  initial period  in order  to pay  interest  on tbe  initial fiat
money  stoclc  This would be a lump-sum  tax to pay  an  equal  lump-sum  benefit.  We ignore  the
possibility  because  it would  have  no real  effect
4govemment  to expand  the  money  supply  from It46  to M in order  to purchase  and  store  Kc goods  in
the initial period.s
1.2 Equilibrium  conditions
Each  young  agent  born  at t chooses  his personal  savings  Qq  taking  taxes  and  the  real  gross
retum  on savings  (call it R1)  as  given,  o maximize  U(c1)  + V(c2)  subject  to equation  (1), along
with the following budget  constraints
(2\  c1  +Q1  =y
(3)  c2 = RsQl  - t1*1
The  first-order  condition  for this  program  is
(4)  U'(y-QJ  = RtV'(RtQt-  rr+r).
We focus  our attention  on those  cases  in which the  reserve  requirement  constraint  is binding;  that
is, x > p/p1*1.  When zs - T Qt,  the  retum to the agents  porfolio  is a weighted  average  of the
return  to capital  and  to money:
(5)  R,  = (1-1)x  + y(1+  p)p/p111
The  clearing  of the  market  for fiat money  requires
(6)  M = ptTNQt.
5  The government's  capital  purchases  arc  equivalent  to a case  in which the  govemment  has
outstanding  government  debt  and  uses  the  expanded  money  supply  to retire some  part of the  debt.
5In an  equilib,rium  with real  saving  equal  ro a  constant  Q, the  price level  p will also  be
constant  and  the  rate  of retum  to savinss  wili be the  constant
(7)  R = (1-1)x  + {1+  p) .
The  govemmcnt  budget  constraint  in the  initial period  requircs  that  the  proceeds  of the  open
market  purchase  be  used  to purchase  government  capital:
(8)  Kg  =  tM - Mol/p
In subsequent  periods  govemment  revenues  include  the  net  return  on storage/capital  (gross
value  less  replacement  costs)  plus  the  lump-sum  tax on the  old. Expenses  are  the  interest  payments
on  reserves.  Formally,  in a stationary  equilibrium
(9)  (x-l)Ke + Nt  = plvflp  .
In short,  a stationary  equilibrium  is a vector  (Q, R, p) that  depends  on a policy vector  (Ke, p, t)
such  that  all the  equilibrium  conditions  equarions  (2)-(9)  are  satisfied  and  equation  (1) holds  with
strict  equality.
1.3 Equilibria without open market operations
Smith  considered  govemment  policies  without  open  market  operations  (Kc = 0), comparing
in panicular  a policy of no interest  on leserves  (p = 0) with a  policy of paying  the market  interest
on  reserves  (p = x-  1).
When  no  interest  is paid  on  reserves,  R = R = 1l-fx  + l and  the  resulting  equilibrium
6level  of savings  Q is given  bye
(10)  u'0 -  Q)  =  Rv'(t  (l-y)x  +  Tl0).
From (6), the equilibrium  price level is i  = Mo/y  N Q.
When  the  matket  rate  of interest  is iraid  on  ieserves  and  frnanced  endrely  through  taxes  on
the  old, we have  that p = x-l  and 1 = pM/p*  , where  p* is equal  to MdI'{Q* and  Q* satisfies
(ll)  u'(y-Q*)  = xv'([xQ* - t).
= xV'([xQ*  - (x-l)tQ*)
Smith  demonstrates  that  paying  interest  on reserves  encourages  savings  (ff  > Q), thus
increasing  the  demand  for reserves,  lowering  the  price  level  (p* . p ).2  Smith's  Proposition  3
establishes  ftat all generations  except  the  initial old are  worse  off when  interest  is paid on reserves
and  financed  in this way,  The  initial old are  better  off with interest  paid  on reserves  because  the the
lower  price  level  increases  the  value  of their initial fiat money  balances.  The  two equilib'ria  are
therefore  not Pareto  comoarable.
1.4 Equilibria with open market operations
The  initial old benefit  from the  oavment  of interest  on reserves  but onlv later
6 Our  T equals  l-Q  as  Q  was  defined  by Smith.
7 The  wealth  effect  of the  increased  rate  of retum  is exactly  offset  by the  taxes  required  to
pay  the  interest,  leaving  only  a  substitution  effect.
7generations  are  asked  to pay  for it under  the  financing  just described.  This intergenerational
transfer  of wealth  raises  an  obvious  question  - why are  all future generations  are  worse  off? Is it
because  interest-bearing  reserves  are  inefficient  or because  they  have  transferred  wealdr  to the
initial generations?{o  resolve  this question  we  must-look  for a method  of financing  the  interest  on
r€serves  that  doesn't  transfer  wealth  to the  initial seneration.
The answer  involve  s an  open  market  purchase  - a pwchase  of assets  from an
expansion  of the  initial fiat money  stock  to offset  the  increased  demand  for reserves.  The  interest
from assets  thus  acquired  will be  used  to lower future  taxes.  We examine  in particular  an
arcommodating  open  market  purchase  -- one  that  leaves  the  price  level  where  it would have  been  in
the  absence  of a change  in reserve  policy,
The  clearing  of the  market  for fiat money  requires  thar
(12)  Pt  =  l4'tQt
If the government  pays  interest  on reserves,  the  demand  for savings  (Q) rises,  lowering  the price
level.  To prcvent  a transfer  of wealth  to the  initial generation,  let us  increase  M to maintain  price
level at  p  = Mo/T  NQ, its value  when  no interest  is paid  on reserves.  Doing so  requires  that  M
satisfy
(13)  p=MdyNQ=lvVyNQ  or
(14)  M  =  MoQ/Q
The  increase  in the  fiat money  stock,  M - Mo = l[o(Q/O  - 1),  will be  used  !o financethe government's  purchase  of capital  worth (the  storage  of)
(15) Kc =  IvIo(Q/Q  -1yp
The  net  proceeds  from  this  capitaVstorage,  (x - l)Ke, will be  used  along  with  lump-
sum  taxes  on theold+o finanep'future  interest'on  reserves  at the  nlte p. lhe  govemment  budget
constraint  (9) can  now be  rritten  as
(16) (x-l)Mo(Q/o  -Dlfi  +Nt =pIWp
We are  now ready  to demonstrate  the  Pareo  inefficiency  of not paying  interest  on
reserves.
Proposition  l:  Steady-state  utility is maximized  by paying the market rate of
interest (p =  x-f) on reserves  when financed  by lump-sum  taxes  on the old and
an accommodating  open market purchase,
hoof:  The  proof proceeds  in two steps.  Fint, we derive  the tax level necessary  to finance
interest  payments  on reserves,  taking  into account  the  op€n  market  purchase  needed  to offset  the
change  in the  real demand  for reserves.  Second,  given  the  policy constraints  we find steady-state
utility as  a function  of Q and  determine  the  Q that  maximizes  steady-state  utility. We then  frnd the
rate  of interest  on reserves  that,  in equilibrium,  will lead  agents  to choose  this utility maximizing  Q.Using the market  clearing  conditions  Ms/p  =  fNQ and  tr4p  =  f{Q,  we can  find
the  following reduced-fonn  expression  for taxes:
(r7)  r  =  (p  + 1- x)yQ  +  (x-1)y0  .
.Recalltom (7) that  the  rate  of rctdm on saVirigs  in a steady  sthie  is
R = (l_-T)x  +  {1+ p)
Together,  (3),  (7),  and  (17)  permit  us  to  find  c2  = R  Q - r, or
c2 =  [(l-y)x+y(l+p)]Q  -  t(p+l-x)]Q  +(x-1)T0l
which  after  some  simplihcation  of terms  is
(18)  c2 =  xQ -  (x-I)1Q
Steady-sate  utility  can  now  be  expressed  as  a function  of Q:
(19)  u(y-O  + V(xQ  -(x-l)yQ)
Steady-state  utility  is maximized when
(20)  U'(y  - Q)/v'(xQ  - (x-1)yq1  =  1
From  (4)  and  (7),  dtis  condition  is met  in equilibrium  ifand only  if reserves  pay  the  market  rate  of
interest,  i.e.,if  l+e  =x.  Q.E.D.
The  intuition behind  the  proposition  is fairly straightforward-  Only when  the  marginal
rate  of substitution  equals  the  rate  at which goods  can  be  transformed  into future  goods  can  the
level of savings  be  optimal.
l0Smith  found  that  interest  reduced  the  utility of future  generations  because  it ins€ased
the  value  ofthe resewes,  providing  a transfer  to the  initial generation  funded  by the  taxes  of future
generations.  Once  the  initial generation  is taxed  through  the  expansion  of the  money  stock  to offset
this benefit,  future  generations  benefrt  unambiguously  With"an  open  market  purchase  of exactly
the size  that  maintains  the  initial value  of fiat money  balances,  drere  is no transfer  fum  the  futue
generations  to the  initial old. (Note  the  feature  of this  policy that  the  government  can  determine  the
correct  size  of the  open  market  operation  by targetting  price stability.) By purchasing  capital  with
the  increase  in the  fiat money  stock,  the  incidental  benefit  to the  initial generation  is now taxed  to
help  finance  the  interest  on reserves.  Without  the  wealth  transfer  to the  initial old, future
generations  are  no longer  made  worse  off by paying  interest  on reserves,  Our results,  therefore,
confrm that  it is the transfer  of wealth  that  is responsible  for Smith's  Pareto  non-comparability
result.
2. Eliminating Reserve  Requirements
A more  straighforward  way to increase  the  rate  of retum  to saving  is the simple
abandonment  of reserve  requirements.  This action  alone  benefits  future  generations  at the  expense
of the  initial generation,  whose  initial balances  of fiat money  become  worthless  (for p1).
Therefore,  the  elimination of reserve  requirements  can  only be shown  to be  a Pareto  improvement
if the  initial generation  can  be  compensated  for dreir  loss.  We will show  that  an open  market  sale  of
t1government  debt  in exchange  for the  initial reserves  [proposed  by Auemheimer  (1974)  and
Bacchetta  and  Caminal  (1990)  in related  contex6sl  can  compensate  the  initial generation,  yer  leave
future  generations  better  off from the  elimination  of reserve  requirements.  In panicular  we will
show  thar  the  elimination  of reserve  .requirements  is the  welfare  cquivalent  of paying  interest  on
reserves  when  both  are  accompanied  by accommodating  open  market  operations.
Proposition  2: The etimination  of reserve  requirements,  with an accommodating
open  market sale,  has  the same  effect  on steady-state  utility as paying market
interest on reserves  with  an accommodating  open market  purchase.
Proof:  To demonstrate  this equivalence,  first we show  that  the  rate  of retum is identical  when
paying  interest  on  reserves  and  removing  reserve  requtements.  Second,  we  show  that
consumption  by the  future  generations  is unchanged.
Establishing  the equality  of the  rates  of return  is trivial.  Clearly,  from equation  (5),
setting  T= 0 results  in R, = 1. With the  identical  rate  of retum,  it is obvious  that  the marginal  rate
of substitution  equals  the  rate  at which  consumption  goods  in period I can  be  uansformed  into
consumption  goods  in period  2. Thus  equation  (20) holds  for the  case  in which reserve
I Auernheimer (19?4) studied changes  in rates  of money creation. Bacchetta  and Caminal
(1990) studied the reduction of reserve  requirements used  to finance a fixed level of government
12
expenditures.requrremen$ are removed.
Removing  reserve  requirements  means  that  the  initial old cannot  use  the  reserves  to
consume  in period  1. The  value  of the  lost  consumption  is yQ. To replace  the  lost  consumption
for the  initial  old;the.govemment  issuesa-permanent  debt  B equal  to
(21) n = NyO.
The  govemment  also  sets  a  lumpsum tax  in each  period  t > 1 to finance  ttre  net  interest  on this
govemment  debt. As before,  the  lump-sum  tax is paid by the  old of the future  genemtions.  Thus,
p1 = (x-1)8. Using  equation  (21),  the  level  of taxes  @er  old  agent)  necessary  to finance  the
interest  palirnents  can  be written  as
t = (x-l)yQ.
Steady-state  consumption  when  old by the  future  generations  is c2  = p q - t.  Substituting  the  rate
of return  when  reserve  requircments  are  removed  and  equation  (22) in the  expression  for second-
period  consumption  yields
c2  =xQ-(x-1)y0.
Note  that  equation  (23)  is identical  to  equation  (18). Thus,  steady-state  utility,  expressed  as
function  of Q, for the  case  in which  reserve  requirements  are  removed  with an  accommodating
open  market  sale  is equivalent  to the  case  in which the  govemment  pays  interest  on reserves,
financed  through  lump-sum  taxes  and  an  accommodating  open  market  purchase.  Q.E.D.
If reserve  requircments  arc  removed,  the  initial old's fiat money  balances  become
(22)
(23)
t3worthless,  the  price  level infinite, The  transfer  from dre  initial old generation  to future  generations
when  reserve  requirements  are  removed  is exactly  the  same  as  the  tansfer from future  generations
to the  initial old when  intercst-bearing  reserves  are  introduced.  An accommodating  open  market
operation  leaves  .the-initial  old generation;just.as  well off as  before  the  policy experiment  is
conducted,  leaving  future  generations  to gain  from the  higher  rate  of r€turn  even  after  financing  the
compensation  of the  initial old.
3. Distorting Taxes
The  analysis  above  depends  on  lump-sum  taxes  for the  financing  of interest  payments.
Real  world govemments,  however,  are  apparently  constrained  to distorting  taxes.  Should  one  still
advocate  the  payment  of interest  on reserves  when  that  intercst  must  come  from distorting  taxes?
The  answer  will depend  on what  is taxed  to pay  interest.  If assets  subject  to resewe  requirements
(storage  in this model)  are  taxed  at a constant  marginal  rate  in order  to make  proportional  interest
payments  on reserves,  the  after-tax  rate  of return  is not changed  by the  payment  of interest.
Certainly,  however,  intermediated  deposits  are  not the  only taxable  quantity.  lrt  us therefore
inmoduce  another  taxable  economic  variable  in order  to inquire  as  to whether  distorting  taxes  on
another  variable  should  be  introduced  to reduce  the  distortion  imposed  by interest-free  required
reserves.
In addition  to the storage  technology,  let there  be  a capital  technology  of this form: an
t4investment  of any  positive  \  goods  in period  t by any  individual will produce  fft)  goods  in period
t+1. It produces  in no other  period.  The  function  f(.) is continuously  differentiable,  increasing,  and
concave  with f (0) = "" and  f (y) < x. We assume  that storage  is only possible  in amounts  greater
than  an  individual's  endowment  y. Agents  are thus  only able  to sore through  intermediaries  that
pool the  endowments  of many  agents.  As before,  a reserve  requirement  is imposed  on storage
(intermediated  deposits)  but not on capital  (which  requires  no intermediation).9
We will confine  our attention  to steady-state  equilibria  in which both  storage  and  capital
are  posirive.  l,et Q represent  intermediated  deposits,  K unintermediated  capital,  and  S total savings
per young  person  (implying that  S = Q + K). As before,  equilibrium  values  of variables  in the
absense  of interest  on rcserves  will be marked  by a carrot  (^). The  frst order  maximization
conditions  with respect  to the  individual's  choice  of deposits  and  unintermediated  capital in the
absence  of interest  are  respectively
(24)  u'(v-Q-Rl  = t(1-1)x+tlv'(t(l-y)x+yl0  +r(R)  )
(25)  u'(y-Q-rl = rirlv'(t(l-y)x+ylQ)+fot)  )
which  togedrer  imply
(26)  fG)  =  t(l-y)x+yl  <  x
The pavment of interest on reserves  will  be financed bv a tax of ct,  times the return from
9 The  reason  for dre  existence  of intermediation  is unimportant  to our rcsults.  It is only
important  that  there  are  two forms  of productive  assets,  one  of which is subject  to reserve
requirements.
15any  asset  (0 < cr  < 1).  The  govemment  will also  engage  in an  open  market  operation  that  maintains
an  unchanged  price  level. The  govemment  must  finance  n€t  interest  on reserves  of (x-lfiS  - K)
from uxes on the  retum  from savings,  crx(S  - K) + cfffi)  and  from the  interest  on the  capital  it
acquires  from  the  open  market  purchase  in the  initial  period,  (x-1)t{(S  - Xj - 15  - t)1. Altogether
this  implies  that
(27)  (x-l)(S-K)  =  ox(S-K)+q,f(K)  + (x-lff(S-K)-(S-R)l
or
(28)  (x-l)y (S  - K)  =  sx(S  - K) + d,f(K)
The  individuals  first-order  maximization  conditions  with market  interest  paid  on
reserves  may  be summarized  as:
(29)  U'(y-Q-K) =  x(l-a)v'(x(l-o)Q)+(l-ct)f(K)  )  and
(30)  x  =  f(K).
Proposition  3:  Payment  of the market rate of interest  (p = x.1) on reserves
increases  steady-state  utility  when financed by a linear tax on the return  from all
assets  and an accommodating  open market purchase,
ftqgf:  The  proof establishes  that  total net  retum  is greater  when  the govemment  pays  interest  on
required  reserves,  financing  these  expenditures  through  an  accommodating  open  market  purchase
16and  linear  capital  taxes  tha.n  when  there  is no interest  on reserves.
Paying  interest  on reserves  makes  future generations  bener  off if for any  given  level  of
savings,  S = S*, the  total rcturn net  of taxes  is greater  when  interest  is paid on reseles:
(31)  (l-o)x(6-K) +'(1=u)fiK) >-{x{1''y)+y1(S.tl  *  rG)
We can  now use  the  govemment  budget  constraint  (28)  to cancel  several  of the tax terms  with
terms  on the  right hand  side  of (3  I ) leaving  us with
(32)  -xK + f(K)  >  -xr  +  rR;
or
(33)  x(R  - r)  >  f(R)  - f(K)
We know that  K > K because  unintermediated  capital  is taxed  when  interest  is paid  on reserves,
Widr f(.) as  a concave  function  (capital  has  a diminishing  marginal  product),  the Mean  Value
Theorem  implies  that
(34)  f(KXR  - K)  >  f(R) - f(K)
When  interest  is paid on reserves,  we know from (30) that  the  two forms of capital  must  offer the
same  marginal  rate  of return,  i.e.,  f(K) = x. It follows  that  the  inequality  (33)  is satisfied,  proving
that  future  generations  are  better  off with interest  paid  on rcserves  even  if it must  be financed
through  a  distorting  capital  tax.  Q.ED.
At fnst glance  Proposition  3 may be  counterintuitive;  intercst  payments  inuoduce  a
distortionary  tax where  there  was  none  before.  The  explanation  is that  reserve  requirements
1.7without  interest  payments  act  like a distorting  tax  even  if they  raise  no revenue.  The  existence  of a
second  type  of capital,  not subject  to reserve  requirements,  is important  for this result  lnterest
frnanced  by taxes  spreads  the  distortion  introduced  by resef,ve  requirements  across  both
intermediated  and.  unintermediated  eapitalr  -'In-this  senser  the  linear  tax  on capital  improves  welfare
for essentially  the same  reason  that  the  Ramsey  Rule  for efficient  taxation  is welfare  improving.
4. Summary and Conclusions
This paper  shows  that  Friedman's  proposal  to pay  interest  on reserves  maximizes
steady  state  welfare,  assuming  that  the  burden  is financed  with lump-sum  taxation  and
accommodating  open  market  purchases.  This  result  modifies  the  Pareto  non-comparability  rcsult
presented  in Smith.
We further  show  that  abandoning  reserve  requirements  is equivalent  to paying  inter€st
on reserves,  provided  that  the  initial old are  compensated.  This compensation  is financed  by an
open  market  sale  of bonds  whose  interest  is funded  from  lump-sum  taxes.
The  accommodation  schemes  considered  here  are  often  observed.  There  is evidence  that
central  banks  routinely  offset  changes  in reserve  policies  with open  market  operauons.  Muelendyke
(1991)  asserts  that  the  Federal  Reserve  smooths  the  effects  of changes  in resewe  requirements.
Using  different  measures  of changes  in reserve  requirements,  Haslag  and  Hein  (1989,  1993)
provide  evidence  suggesting  that  the  Federal  Reserve  systematically  accommodates  decreases  in
18reserve  requirements,  for example,  letting the  quantity  of high-powered  money  fall.
Finally, we demonstrate  that  interest  payments  on reserves  results  in higher  steady-state
welfare  (given  an  accommodating  open  market  purchase)  even  if financed  with a distortionary  tax
applied  against  capital. It-is importantthardistonionary  tax is applied  to unintermediated  capital,  as
well as  intermediated  capital,  which underscores  the  distonion  imposed  by reserve  requircments.
In short,  sprearling  a distortion  across  the two types  of capital  is more  efficient than  disorting only
intermediated  caoital.  lo
lo It should  be noted  that  the  policy implications  ofthis paper  apply  to all forms  of frat
money,  not  just reserves.  The  commonly  imposed  prohibition  on the  issuance  of private  currency
is in essence  a  reserve  requirement  of l00%a.  Dropping  this  prohibition  or  paying  interest  on  fiat
currency  will thus  also  result  in a Pareto  improvement  when  accompanied  by an accommodating
open  market  operation.
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